Imperfect credit markets: implications for monetary policy by Vlieghe, Gertjan W
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Imperfect credit markets: implications
for monetary policy
Gertjan W Vlieghe
London School of Economics
20. March 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12957/
MPRA Paper No. 12957, posted 28. January 2009 03:25 UTC
Imperfect credit markets: implications for monetary
policy∗
Gertjan W. Vlieghe †
20 March 2007
Abstract
I develop a model for monetary policy analysis that features sig-
nificant feedback from asset prices to macroeconomic quantities. The
feedback is caused by credit market imperfections, which dynamically
affect how efficiently labour and capital are being used in aggregate. I
then analyse what implications this mechanism has for monetary pol-
icy. The paper offers three insights. First, the monetary transmission
mechanism works not only via nominal rigidites but also via a reallo-
cation of productive resources away from the most productive agents.
Second, following an adverse productivity shock there is a dynamic
trade-off between the immediate fall in output, which is an effcient re-
sponse to the productivity fall, and the fall in output thereafter, which
is caused by a reallocation of resources away from the most productive
agents. The more the initial output fall is dampened with a temporary
rise in inflation, the more the adverse future effects of the reallocation
of resources are mitigated. Third, in a full welfare-based analysis of
optimal monetary policy I show that it is optimal to have some infla-
tion variability, even if the only shocks in the economy are productivity
shocks. The optimal variability of inflation is small, but the costs of
stabilising inflation too aggressively can be large.
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1 Summary
This paper aims to address the following questions. If credit mar-
kets do not work perfectly, how does that affect the overall economy?
Furthermore, if monetary policy can influence the level of economic
activity in the short run, how should monetary policy be set optimally
in the presence of credit market imperfections?
It is thought that credit markets may not operate perfectly be-
cause of limitations on how much information a lender has about the
quality of the borrower, or limitations on how well contracts between
lenders and borrowers can be enforced. One consequence of such credit
market imperfections might be that borrowing can only take place (or
take place more cheaply) against collateral, such as land, buildings,
machines. If that is the case, then changes in the value of collateral
will affect the ability of firms and households to borrow. This could
have important consequences for aggregate economic activity.
I consider in particular a case where there are two types of firms,
those with high productivity and those with low productivity. Ideally,
those with low productivity would lend all their resources to high pro-
ductivity firms, so that high productivity firms can carry out all pro-
duction. But when there are collateral constraints, some production
is also carried out by low productivity firms. The total level of out-
put is therefore determined by how much of the economy’s productive
resources are held by the high productivity firms. High productivity
firms still end up borrowing from low productivity firms, but not as
much as would be desirable in the absence of borrowing constraints.
Following a shock that reduces current output and/or the price of
capital (which is used as collateral), the net worth of high productiv-
ity firms falls by more than the net worth of low productivity firms,
because high productivity firms are highly leveraged. This means that
high productivity firms can only afford to buy a lower share of the
total capital stock for production in the following period. Because
capital shifts to those with lower productivity, this reduces expected
future returns on capital, which depresses the value of capital today,
and exacerbates the initial redistribution of net worth. Output falls
further in the subsequent period, as the economy’s resources are now
used much less efficiently. It takes time for the high productivity firms
to rebuild their share of the capital stock, and output is therefore de-
pressed for many periods, even if the initial disturbance only lasted a
single period.
How does this mechanism interact with monetary policy? First, the
transmission mechanism of interest rates in this model works through
sticky goods prices as well as a reallocation of resources to less efficient
producers. So the output response to monetary shocks is larger than
in a model without borrowing constraints. Second, when responding
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to productivity shocks, the monetary policy-maker faces a trade-off.
It is efficient for output to fall immediately following an adverse pro-
ductivity shock. So, considered in isolation, there is no reason for a
monetary policy-maker to offset the inial output fall. But the pres-
ence of borrowing constraints means that there is a trade-off between
current inflation and future output. The larger the immediate fall in
output, the larger the reallocation of resources away from the most
productive firms, which will lead to future output being inefficiently
low. By allowing inflation to rise temporarily and thereby dampening
the inital output fall, monetary policy can mitigate inefficiently large
future output fluctuations in subsequent periods.
But monetary policy cannot accomodate inflation too far, as infla-
tion expectations must remain anchored, and inflation variability itself
is costly too. So this begs the question of how much inflation variability
it is optimal to tolerate. I answer this question formally by assuming
that the monetary policy-maker maximises the welfare of the private
sector.There are two frictions in the economy: credit market frictions
and sticky prices. The policy-maker has a single instrument available,
the nominal interest rate, to off-set the inefficiencies generated by these
frictions. I find that the cost of responding to inflation too aggressively
can be large, by creating excessive variability in output. By allowing
only a small amount of inflation variability, policy can achieve a large
reduction in output variability.
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2 Introduction
This paper aims to address the following questions. If credit market
imperfections are an important feature of the economy, how might they
affect the economy’s response to shocks? Furthermore, if monetary pol-
icy can influence real outcomes in the short run, how should monetary
policy be set optimally in the presence of credit market imperfections?
The model economy consists of ex-ante identical entrepreneurs who
can produce intermediate goods using capital, which is in fixed supply
(e.g. land), a variable input (e.g. inventories) and labour. Using the
approach of Kiyotaki (1998), I assume that some entrepreneurs are
more productive than others, but spells of high productivity do not
last, and arrive randomly. While an entrepreneur is highly produc-
tive, he will want to invest as much as possible in his own technol-
ogy. Entrepreneurs with low productivity, on the other hand, would
rather invest in the technology of others, as this generates superior re-
turns. Let us therefore call the entrepreneurs that currently have high
productivity ‘producers’, and the entrepreneurs with low productivity
‘investors’. In principle, investors could lend to producers so that pro-
ducers end up applying their technology to the entire capital stock.
This would be the first-best outcome. But it is assumed that there are
credit market imperfections, so borrowing can only take place against
collateral. The larger the net worth of the borrower, the more capital
he can buy. Moreover, since capital serves as collateral as well as a
factor of production, an increase in the value of capital will increase
the net worth of a producer who already had some capital installed
and will therefore allow him to invest more.
To allow monetary policy to influence aggregate real outcomes,
there has to be some friction, or non-neutrality, preventing instan-
taneous adjustment of prices, wages, debt contracts or asset portfolios.
My approach is to assume that product prices cannot fully adjust, but
the results of the paper do not hinge crucially on this particular choice
of monetary non-neutrality.
In this model economy the wealth distribution has important ef-
fects on aggregate output. Following a shock that reduces current
output and/or the price of capital, the net worth of producers falls
by more than the net worth of investors, because producers are highly
leveraged. This means that producers can only afford to buy a lower
share of the total capital stock for production in the following period.
Because capital shifts to those with lower productivity, this reduces
expected future returns, which depresses the value of capital today,
and exacerbates the initial redistribution of wealth from producers to
investors. Output falls further in the subsequent period, as the econ-
omy’s resources are now used much less efficiently. It takes time for
the producers to rebuild their share of the wealth distribution to its
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steady-state level, and output is therefore below its steady-state level
for many periods, even if the initial disturbance only lasted a single
period.
How does this mechanism interact with monetary policy? First,
the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks works through nomi-
nal rigidities as well as a reallocation of resources to less efficient pro-
ducers. So the output response to monetary shocks is larger than
in a model without credit imperfections. Moreover, the fall in output
will manifests itself as a fall in measured total factor productivity, even
though firm-level productivity has remained unchanged. Second, when
responding to productivity shocks, the monetary policy-maker faces a
trade-off. It is efficient for output to fall immediately following an ad-
verse productivity shock. So, considered in isolation, there is no reason
for a monetary policy-maker to offset the inial output fall by allowing
inflation to rise temporarily. But the presence of credit frictions means
that there is a dynamic trade-off between dampening the immediate fall
in output by allowing inflation to rise temporarily, and reducing future
falls in output. The larger the immediate fall in output, the larger
the reallocation of resources away from the most productive agents,
which will lead to future output being inefficiently low. By allowing
inflation to rise temporarily and using nominal rigidities to dampen
the inital output fall, monetary policy can mitigate inefficiently large
future output fluctuations.
But inflation variability is costly too, so this begs the question
of how much inflation variability it is optimal to tolerate. I answer
this question by assuming that the monetary policy-maker tries to
maximise the welfare of the private sector agents, which is commonly
referred to as a Ramsey problem. There are two frictions in the econ-
omy: credit market frictions and sticky prices. The policy-maker has
a single instrument available, the nominal interest rate, to off-set the
inefficiencies generated by these frictions. I find that, by allowing a
small amount of inflation variability, policy can achieve a large reduc-
tion in output variability. In other words, the cost of responding to
inflation too aggressively can be large.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3 re-
views the literature that relates to the questions studied in this paper.
Section 4 presents the model in detail. Section 5 outlines the com-
petitive equilibrium. Section 6 presents quantitative results. Section
7 describes how monetary policy should optimally be set. Section 8
analyses how sensitive the results are to variations in parameter choices
and section 9 concludes.
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3 Related literature
There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature that investigates
the qualitative and quantitative importance of credit frictions in the
propagation of shocks. Gertler (1988) gives a useful overview of the lit-
erature up to that date, and Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998)
specifically review the empirical micro-evidence. A first clear statement
of how the financial health of borrowers could influence the propaga-
tion of shocks was made by Fisher (1933), who emphasised that the
fall in inflation following a downturn in the economy could exacerbate
the downturn by increasing the real burden of debt faced by borrow-
ers, which would trigger fire sales of assets and bankruptcies. Impor-
tant contributions in making the theoretical case for credit frictions at
the micro-level were Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), who showed that credit rationing could occur as an equilibrium
if lenders have insufficient information about borrowers. At the macro-
level, Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) showed that in a model where each
agent faces exogenous borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic produc-
tivity, aggregate output and asset price dynamics will depend on the
entire distribution of wealth. Their model also features more volatile
asset prices than the complete markets version of that model, but not
necessarily an amplification of output effects. Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) showed that credit market imperfection could lead increased
persistence of the effects of shocks on aggregate output. Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and (1998) embed a costly-state verification mecha-
nism into an otherwise standard real business cycle model, and analyse
to what extent this modifies the properties of the real business cycle
model. They find that the effect of shocks on output can be either
amplified or dampened, depending on which sector of the economy the
financial constraint applies to. They also find that in their particu-
lar set-up there is either amplification or increased persistence, but
not both. Kocherlakota (2000) constructs a useful, highly simplified
version of a credit constrained economy to show that the amount of
amplification is related to the share in production of the collateralis-
able asset, and that the degree of amplification that can plausibly be
achieved in his setting is small.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also examine the effect of credit market
frictions on business cycle dynamics, but instead of putting constraints
on information, they put constraints on contracting, in the sense that
borrowers cannot commit to repay. Following an adverse shock, there
is a redistribution of capital from highly productive agents to less pro-
ductive agents, and this results in an amplified and persistent drop
in output following a small and temporary drop in productivity. Kiy-
otaki (1998) extends this mechanism by considering a situation where
agents are not permanently stuck in a high or low productivity state,
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but their productivity state changes stochastically. This leads to added
richness in the dynamics, as the persistence of the stochastic productiv-
ity switching process affects the dynamics of aggregate output. A set
of papers that includes Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996),
Alvarez and Jerman (2000) use a more general constraint on contract-
ing, where multi-period and state-contingent financial contracts are
possible as long as the borrower has the incentive to repay in every
state of the world. However, earlier models generally feature exogenous
income processes in order to make them tractable. Cooley, Marimon
and Quadrini (2004) who embed this contracting structure in a model
with production. They find that productivity shocks cause highly am-
plified output fluctuations when there are incentive constraints on fi-
nancial contracting. Jermann and Quadrini (2002) propose a model
with limitations on contracting where an endogenous firm size dis-
tribution interacts with borrowing constraints to produce aggregate
fluctuations. Expectations about future productivity causes a rise in
asset prices, which eases borrowing constraints. That concentrates
capital in smaller, constrained firms, which are more productive due
to diminishing returns to scale, leading to increased aggregate output.
There is some empirical literature that finds evidence for a Kiyotaki
and Moore type mechanism of reallocation across different producers.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005) find that the amount of capital realloca-
tion across firms is procyclical, and that the dispersion of productivity
across firms is countercyclical. These two facts are consistent with a
model where capital needs to flow to the producers with the highest
productivity, but these flows can more easily happen during cyclical
upturns, when informational or contractual frictions are smaller. A
second empirical paper that is directly relevant to this framework is
Barlevy (2003), who shows that highly productive firms tend to bor-
row more, again consistent with a framework where credit needs to
flow from low to high productivity firms, making highly productive
firms highly indebted.
All the models discussed so far are real models. There is no role for
money or monetary policy. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) in-
troduce the costly-state verification mechanism into a New Keynesian
business cycle model, i.e. into a real business cycle framework with
nominal rigidities added. They use this model to analyse macroeco-
nomic dynamics resulting from a wide range of shocks including mon-
etary policy shocks, and find that, compared to a version of the model
that has no financial frictions, the investment response to shocks is am-
plified and more persistent, leading to an amplified and more persistent
response of aggregate output. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) then use
the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) framework to ask whether
monetary policy should respond to asset prices as well as to inflation
and the output gap. In practice, this means analysing whether, in
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the class of ad hoc monetary policy rules, a rule that includes asset
prices performs better than one that does not. To stack the cards
in favour of finding a strong role for asset prices in monetary policy,
the authors add to their model non-fundamental movements in asset
prices, or bubbles, which, via the collateral effect, have real effects on
investment and output. They find that there is very little benefit to
be had, in terms of minimising an ad hoc loss function, from letting
monetary policy-makers respond to asset prices. Iacoviello (2005) car-
ries out a similar analysis, based on the credit frictions framework of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and also concludes that there is little ben-
efit to be derived from monetary policy that responds directly to asset
prices. Faia and Monacelli (2004) extend the analysis of Bernanke and
Gertler (2001) by examining a wider class of monetary policy rules,
and by evaluating an approximation of welfare, rather than an ad hoc
loss function. They find the optimal coefficients on various arguments
of a monetary policy rule, and then experiment with changing those
coefficients, and analyse the resulting welfare loss. They too find that
including asset prices in the monetary policy rule does not improve
welfare much.
A shortcoming of these analyses is that the class of monetary pol-
icy rules that is considered is rather arbitrary, and even if changing or
restricting coefficients on asset prices has only a small effect on wel-
fare, there is potentially a large welfare loss from using the restricted
monetary policy rule relative to a fully optimal monetary policy 1. So
it is not clear at all what one can conclude from the statement that
asset prices do not have a big coefficient in optimised ad hoc policy
rules, and that changes in such coefficients do not have a large effect
on welfare or a measure of loss.
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) use a different methodology to analyse
the problem, and get closer to what is probably the more interesting
question: if credit frictions are important, does that mean monetary
policy makers should try to achieve a significantly different path for
macroeconomic variables compared to an economy without credit fric-
tions? The authors analyse the response of macroeconomic variables
in a model with credit frictions and nominal rigidities (based on the
mechanisms of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)) , and compare
this with two alternatives. First, the response of a frictionless econ-
omy, which provides the benchmark of what the optimal response of all
variables should be. Second, a New Keynesian economy with nominal
rigidities but no credit frictions. They conclude that in the case of a
gradual productivity increase (which is akin to a demand shock, as the
bulk of the productivity increase occurs in the future), it is sufficient for
1By fully optimal monetary policy I mean the Ramsey solution to a planning problem.
See e.g. Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004), chapter 30 for a very general formulation
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monetary policy simply to respond to inflation. A stronger response to
inflation will bring the economy closer to a frictionless economy. But in
the case of shocks to net worth, responding more strongly to inflation
causes output to deviate further from its optimal path, so there is a
short-run policy trade-off between inflation and output variability. A
rule that responds to net worth as well as inflation can achieve lower
output variability at the expense of higher inflation variability. They
conclude, as many others have done, that there is little benefit from
monetary policy responding to asset prices, but they speculate that it
may well pay to respond to net worth or the spread between risky and
risk-free interest rates, although they do not develop this idea any fur-
ther. This paper takes the next logical step in the literature, which is to
carry out a full quantitative analysis of what paths of macroeconomic
variables monetary policy should try to achieve in order to maximise
welfare, if there are both nominal rigidities and credit frictions in the
economy.
4 The environment
The model features a basic credit frictions mechanism due to Kiyotaki
(1998), which is extended to allow for endogenous labour supply, mo-
nopolistic competition and a role for monetary policy.
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs. They are identical in terms
of preferences. Their production technology is also identical, up to a
productivity factor, which randomly switches between high (α) and low
(γ). Denote those who currently have high productivity ‘producers’,
and those who currently have low productivity ‘investors’. The pro-
ductivity factor follows an exogenous Markov process with transition
probability matrix
P =
[
1− δ δ
nδ 1− nδ
]
(1)
so the probability of switching from high productivity to low produc-
tivity is δ, and the probability of switching from low productivity to
high productivity is nδ. This probability matrix implies that from
any initial distribution, the distribution will converge to a stationary
distribution with a ratio of productive to unproductive agents of n.
Producers maximise life-time utility given by
max
ct
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt ln ct (2)
s.t. budget constraint,
ct + xt + qt(kt − kt−1) + ztlt =
yt
ϕt
+
bt
rt
− bt−1 (3)
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production technology,
yt = α
(
kt−1
σ
)σ (
xt−1
η
)η (
lt
1− η − σ
)1−η−σ
(4)
and borrowing constraint
bt 6 Etqt+1kt (5)
The variable ct denotes consumption, xt denotes a non-durable
input (eg inventories), kt denotes durable capital, zt denotes the wage
paid, lt denotes the quantity of labour employed, bt denotes the amount
of real borrowing taken out at time t and repayable at time t+1, qt is
the price of capital, and rt is the real interest rate payable on borrowing
bt.
It is assumed that producers do not consume their output directly,
but sell it to a monopolistically competitive retailer, who then offers
the diversified goods back to producers, investors and workers with
a mark-up of ϕt. That means that one unit of output produced can
be sold to retailers for 1/ϕt. All variables are denominated in terms
of a consumption index. Define a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregate of a
continuum of differentiated goods of type z ∈ [0, 1] each with price p(z)
ct =
[∫ 1
0
ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(6)
The corresponding price index, defined as the minimum cost of a
unit of the consumption aggregate, is defined as
pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt(z)
1−θ
] 1
1−θ
(7)
For simplicity, it is assumed that inventories are costlessly created
from the consumption aggregate, so that their relative price in terms
of consumption is 1.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), borrowing constraints are
interpreted as follows: it is assumed that when an entrepreneur has
installed some capital, he invests some specific skill into that capital
to generate output. The total value of his project is therefore the
next period resale value of the installed capital plus the value of the
output that can be generated using his specific skill. But he cannot
commit to investing his specific skill: once the capital is in place, he
can always choose to walk away. Because of this inability to commit to
full repayment, the investor will never lend more than the resale value
of capital. It is assumed that, should the value of collateral fall short of
what was expected at the time the loan was taken out, the entrepreneur
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still repays the borrowing in full, because by the time he finds out about
the realisation of the aggregate shock, he has already produced, and no
longer has the opportunity to walk away.2 Also following Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), it is assumed that, after the initial uncertainty about
aggregate productivity is resolved, agents assume that future aggregate
productivity is constant. In other words, their decisions are assumed
to be unaffected by aggregate uncertainty.
It is useful to define ut ≡ qt − Et
qt+1
rt
, the user cost of a unit of
capital.
If we assume the borrowing constraint is binding, which will be
verified later, we can rewrite the budget constraint as
ct+xt+utkt+ztlt =
α
ϕt
(
kt−1
σ
)σ (
xt−1
η
)η (
lt
1− η − σ
)1−η−σ
+qtkt−1−bt−1
(8)
To solve this, we break up the problem into two steps. First, given
last period’s capital and intermediate goods, what is the optimal de-
mand for labour?
pit = max
lt
{
α
ϕt
(
kt−1
σ
)σ (
xt−1
η
)η (
lt
1− η − σ
)1−η−σ
− ztlt
}
(9)
It can be shown that the maximised profit after paying for labour
input is
pit = (η + σ)
yt
ϕt
(10)
For the second step of the producer’s problem, we analyse what
combination of capital and inventories he should buy to minimise ex-
penditure, given a desired level of profits.3
mt = min
kt,xt
{utkt + xt} (11)
s.t.Etpit+1 > pi (12)
Let λt denote the Lagrangean multiplier on the profit constraint.
Substituting the optimal level of labour demanded into the production
function, the first-order conditions become
2He could still have an incentive to walk away if the debt burden exceeds not only the
value of his collateral, but exceeds the value of his collateral plus current output. It is
assumed that shocks are never that large.
3The actual level of profits is irrelevant to the optimisation problem given the constant
returns to scale technology.
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ut = Et
{
λt
(
α
ϕt+1
) 1
η+σ
z
−
1−η−σ
η+σ
t+1
(
σ
η
) η
η+σ
(
xt
kt
) η
η+σ
}
(13)
1 = Et
{
λt
(
α
ϕt+1
) 1
η+σ
z
−
1−η−σ
η+σ
t+1
(
σ
η
)
−
σ
η+σ
(
xt
kt
)
−
σ
η+σ
}
(14)
This can be simplified to
ut =
σxt
ηkt
(15)
Note that λt is the resource cost of another unit of profit, or, in
other words, 1/λt is the return on investment. For convenience we
define this as a new variable:
rpt ≡ Et
{(
α
ϕt+1
) 1
η+σ
z
−
1−η−σ
η+σ
t+1 u
−
σ
η+σ
t
}
(16)
In a similar way, we can also calculate the ex post return from
having used resources xt−1, kt−1 and lt in the optimal combination
given ut−1, zt and ϕt. This return is equal to:
rpt−1 ≡
{(
j
ϕt
) 1
η+σ
z
−
1−η−σ
η+σ
t u
−
σ
η+σ
t−1
}
(17)
In this equation, j = α, γ depending on whether the entrepreneur
had high or low productivity in the previous period.
Substituting the optimal labour demand and factor demand con-
ditions into the production function, we can now write the budget
constraint as
ct +mt = r
j
t−1mt−1 + qtkt−1 − bt (18)
This can be interpreted as a savings problem with uncertain returns
(eg Sargent (1987)). The optimal decision rules for consumption and
investment are linear in wealth:
ct = (1− β)(r
j
t−1mt−1 + qtkt−1 − bt) (19)
mt = β(r
j
t−1mt−1 + qtkt−1 − bt) (20)
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4.1 Investors
Let lower-case variables with a prime denote the choices of an individ-
ual investor. The labour demand conditions facing the agents with low
productivity, i.e. the investors, are the same as those for the producers,
so the maximised profits after paying the wage bill are
pi′t = (η + σ)
y′t
ϕt
(21)
The second step of the problem, minimising the expenditure on x′t
and k′t, is solved by maximising
min
x′t,k
′
t
(
qt − Et
qt+1
rt
)
k′t + x
′
t (22)
s.t.pi′t+1 > pi (23)
Using our earlier definition of ut, this problem is again parallel to
that faced by producers, except that the rate of return for investors is
rit ≡ Et
{(
γ
ϕt+1
) 1
η+σ
z
−
1−η−σ
η+σ
t+1 u
−
σ
η+σ
t
}
(24)
Just as for producers, the decision rule for consumption and in-
vestment of investors is therefore also linear in wealth with the same
coefficients.
4.2 Retailers
Retailers buy output and use a costless technology to turn output
goods into differentiated consumption or input goods, which they sell
onwards. The separation of producers and retailers is a modelling
choice similar to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and is cho-
sen to introduce monopolistic competition while maintaining tractable
aggregation of producers. If producers operate directly in monopolisti-
cally competitive markets, they no longer face constant returns to scale
at the firm level, and their optimisation problem will no longer yield
the linear decision rules that are needed for tractable aggregation. Per
period real profits for the retailers are given by
Πt(pt(z)) =
(pt(z)− p
p
t )
pt
yRt (z) (25)
where ppt is the nominal price of output goods, so that
ppt
pt
= 1ϕt . In
other words, ϕt is the retail sector’s average mark-up. Retailer output
is denoted yRt (z).
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Demand for each retailer’s output is given by
yRt (z) =
(
pt(z)
pt
)
−θ
Y Rt (26)
where Y Rt is aggregate demand for retail goods, which is given by
Y Rt =
[∫ 1
0
yRt (z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(27)
In the baseline model, it is assumed that some fraction κ of retailers
must set their price, p2,t(z), one period in advance, while the remain-
der can change their price, p1,t(z) each period. Each type of retailer
maximises profits, leading to the following first order conditions:
p1,t(z)
pt
=
θ
θ − 1
1
ϕt
(28)
Et−1
{
Λt−1,t
Y Rt
p−θt
[
p2,t(z)
pt
−
θ
θ − 1
1
ϕt
]}
= 0 (29)
The term Λt−1,t is a discount factor applied at time t− 1 to profits
earned at time t. It is assumed that retailers are owned by workers, so
it is the workers’ discount factor that is relevant here. The aggregate
price level evolves according to:
pt =
[
(1 − κ)p1−θ1,t + κp
1−θ
2,t
] 1
1−θ (30)
I will end up working with a log-linearised model, and it is conve-
nient to note already that the first-order conditions for retailer profit
maximisation, combined with the evolution of the aggregate price level,
once linearised, will give the following pricing equation:
pit = Et−1pit −
1− κ
κ
ϕ̂t (31)
where x̂t denotes log deviations from the steady-state.
In an extension of the model, I consider an environment where re-
tailers face a quadratic cost of changing their price, following Rotem-
berg (1982). This is implemented by adding a cost term to the per
period profit function so that it becomes:
Πt(pt(z)) =
(pt(z)− p
p
t )
pt
yRt (z)−
ψ
2
(
pt(z)
pt−1(z)
− 1
)2
(32)
Adjustment cost in prices is convenient to work with in welfare
analysis because we can consider equilibria where all agents set the
same price. This stands in contrast to the Calvo (1983) staggered
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price formulation, in which different producers charge different prices,
which significantly complicates aggregation. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004a) use the quadratic cost formulation for welfare analysis.
This leads to the following aggregate pricing equation, or Phillips
curve:
pit (pit − 1) = βEt
[
uw,t+1
uw,t
pit+1 (pit+1 − 1)
]
+
θ − 1
ψ
(yt + y
′
t)
(
θ
θ − 1
1
ϕt
− 1
)
(33)
Retailers are owned by workers, so it is their marginal utility uw,t
that determines how future profits are to be discounted. I consider
only symmetric equilibria where all retailers set the same price.
4.3 Workers
There is a set of agents in the economy who have no access to pro-
ductive technology, but who can work for the producers and investors.
They derive utility from consumption and leisure, and their objective
is to maximise
max
ct,lt
∞∑
t=0
βt ln
(
ct −
χ
1 + τ
l1+τt
)
(34)
s.t.cwt +
bwt
rt
= ztlt + b
w
t−1 +Πt (35)
where lt is the fraction of time spent on work, and Πt are the profits
from the retail sector, which is owned by the workers.4
Setting the workers’ marginal utility of leisure equal to their marginal
utility of consumption, the labour supply decision is
zt = χl
τ
t (36)
4
Paying profits to the workers makes the model very tractable, but strictly speaking the
workers would not want to own the retailers in equilibrium, because they do not want to
save, as will be shown later. They are prevented from selling the retailers by assumption.
An alternative would be to consider retailers as consuming agents in their own right, i.e.
give the retailers a utility function, so that they themselves could consume the profits
from their technology of diversifying goods. Just like the workers, retailers would not
want to save in equilibrium due to the low interest rate, and they would not be able to
borrow against future profits because there is no collateral. So they would simply consume
the profits each period. The model results would therefore be identical, but come at the
expenses of more complexity.
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It is to be verified later that the interest rate on bonds is below
the rate of time preference 1/β. This implies that, near the station-
ary state, the workers will choose not to hold any bonds, and simply
consume their wage and profit income. Their consumption therefore
becomes:
cwt = ztlt +Πt (37)
4.4 Monetary authorities
Prices in the economy are set in money terms. I assume such a ‘cashless
limit’ (Woodford (2003)) economy here, so that money balances, and
therefore the central bank’s balance sheet, approach zero. Given this
assumption, it is a reasonable approximation to omit money from the
agents’ utility function and budget constraint. A similar approach is
used, for example, by Aoki (2001) who also omits money balances from
a model that allows the central bank to set nominal interest rates. The
central bank simply announces the one-period nominal interest rate Rt,
which means that it stands ready to deposit or lend any amount5 the
private sector desires at this rate, subject to a (infinitely small) spread.
The spread ensures that the private sector will attempt to clear the
loan market first without resorting to the central bank. No private
agent would be willing to borrow at a rate higher than that offered
by the central bank, and no private agents would deposit funds that
receive a lower return than that offered by the central bank. This arbi-
trage mechanism is similar to the way actual monetary policy operates
in countries such as New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and
Scandinavian countries, although in practice the spreads are of course
not infinitely small. This environment gives rise to an arbitrage con-
dition between real and nominal rates of return, evaluated using the
marginal utility of the investors.
Et
{
βRt
Pt
Pt+1
1
c′t+1
}
= Et
{
βrit
1
c′t+1
}
(38)
The central bank is assumed to follow a simple rule for setting
monetary policy, 6 by responding to current inflation. There are also
random deviations from the rule, which we will interpret as monetary
policy shocks.
5The central bank does not have better enforcement mechanisms for the collection of
loan repayments than does the private sector. It will therefore not lend any funds to a
producer who is already at the binding borrowing constraint.
6Sargent and Wallace (1975) showed that if the interest rate follows an exogenous
path, the price level is indeterminate. However, McCallum (1981) showed that the price
level can be determinate under an interest rate rule if interest rates respond to a nominal
variable, such as the price level in his paper, or inflation in my case.
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Rt
ri
= piλt exp(ε
R
t ) (39)
5 Competitive Equilibrium
We now look for a competitive rational expectations equilibrium for
this model economy. This will consist of aggregate decision rules for
consumption, investment, labour supply and asset holdings, and aggre-
gate laws of motion so that market clearing and individual optimality
conditions hold. As will be shown, the distribution of wealth can be
summarised by the share of wealth owned by producers.7 Let capital
letters denote aggregate variables. The market clearing conditions are
that
Bt +B
′
t +B
W
t = 0 (40)
Kt +K
′
t = K (41)
and that labour supply equals labour demand. The market clearing
condition goods is then 8:
Y Rt = Yt + Y
′
t (42)
Ct + C
′
t +Xt +X
′
t + C
w
t =
Yt + Y
′
t
ϕt
+Πt (43)
Aggregate retailers’ profits will be equal to:
Πt =
(
1−
1
ϕt
)
(Yt + Y
′
t )−
ψ
2
(pit − 1)
2
(44)
where the quadratic term is omitted in the case of staggered pricing.
Note that the individual decision rules for consumption and investment
7In model simulations I will consider a stochastic process for aggregate productivity.
Because each entrepreneur’s problem collapses to a linear savings problem with log con-
sumption, the fact that future returns are uncertain does not affect the consumption and
savings decision. Where uncertainty might affect decision rules is that borrowers may
not want to borrow up to the borrowing limit if uncertainty about future asset prices
is large. In other words, they might not leverage to the maximum permitted, to reduce
the risk of leveraged loss under an adverse aggregate shock. Similar to Iacoviello (2005)
and Kiyotaki (1998), I only consider an approximation of the model where the borrowing
constraint binds at all times.
8This clearing conditions holds only in a neighbourhood of the steady state for the
staggered pricing model, due to the different aggregators for consumers and retailers. But
for the quadratic adjustment cost model, all retailers choose the same output level so the
aggregation is exact
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are all linear, so that we can simply sum them to obtain aggregate
decision rules and laws of motion. Each agent consumes a fraction
1− β of their wealth and reinvests a fraction β of their wealth.
The following is asserted, to be verified later: we consider equilibria
near a steady state where the investors hold some capital for their own
production. This has two implications. First, investors must then be
indifferent between holding capital for production and bonds, so that
they equalise the expected return to each
rit = rt (45)
Second, because we have shown that
rpt =
(
α
γ
) 1
η+σ
rit > r
i
t (46)
it follows that the borrowing constraint is indeed binding near the
steady state, since producers achieve a larger return on their own pro-
ductive investment than the interest rate they have to pay on the bonds
they issue.
Next, it is useful to define aggregate wealth as the quantity of
output available for consumption or reinvestment, i.e. after paying the
wage bill.
Wt = (η + σ)
Yt + Y
′
t
ϕt
+ qtK (47)
We also define the share of wealth held by producers as st.
We can now write a law of motion for aggregate wealth as
Wt+1 =
[
rpt st + r
i
t(1− st)
]
βWt (48)
Using the Markov-process for the way agents switch between having
high and low productivity, the law of motion for the share of wealth
can be written as
st+1 =
(1− δ)α˜st + nδγ˜(1− st)
α˜st + γ˜(1− st)
(49)
where α˜ = α
1
η+σ and similarly for γ˜.
I now want to consider an aggregate disturbance to productivity. I
achieve this by multiplying α and γ by a productivity disturbance εP .
The assumed stochastic process for the productivity disturbance is that
its log follows an autoregressive process with a normally distributed
shock:
ε̂P,t+1 = ρε̂P,t + νt+1 (50)
The full list of model equations is listed in the appendix for ease of
reference.
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6 Model solution
6.1 Dynamics
The system of difference equations that constitute the full model is
log-linearised around the steady state, and solved using the Schur
decomposition as described in Soderlind (1999), to write the non-
predetermined variables as a linear function of the predetermined vari-
ables and the shocks. The steady state is the level that aggregate
variables tend to when there are no aggregate shocks. Associated with
these levels for aggregate variables is a stationary wealth distribution
summarised by the share of wealth owned by producers, st = s.
We consider only non-explosive, determinate solutions. For a so-
lution to be determinate (following Blanchard and Kahn (1980)), it
is necessary for the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle to
correspond to the number of non-predetermind variables. In the cal-
ibration that I use this is indeed the case, for a monetary policy rule
that responds to inflation with a coefficient greater than 1.
6.2 Steady state
It is instructive to consider the expression for the steady-state interest
rate:
r =
1
β
(
γ˜
α˜s+ γ˜(1− s)
)
<
1
β
(51)
Since s < 1, the real interest rate is strictly lower than the (inverse
of) the rate of time preference. At these low interest rates, workers will
not wish to save, so workers choose not to participate in asset markets.
This proves the earlier assertion that workers simply consume their
wage and profit income in each period.
6.3 Frictionless model
Before turning to the properties of the full model, I show what the prop-
erties of the model would be without binding borrowing constraints.
In that case, the efficient allocation would always be reached, in the
sense that the most productive agents would always hold the entire
capital stock. It can be shown that the law of motion for aggregate
output is:
Yt+1 = ε
τ+1
τ+η+σ
P,t+1 (Yt)
η(τ+1)
τ+η+σ c (52)
where c denotes a constant term that is a function of the model
parameters. This implies that output dynamics are entirely driven by
the exogenous process for aggregate productivity and lagged output.
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Table 1: Calibrated parameter values for the baseline model
parameter assigned value
β 0.99
η 0.1
σ 0.3
τ 0.5
χ 0.29
γ 0.12
κ 0.5
θ 11
λ 1.5
α/γ 1.034
n 0.0073
δ 0.5
There is no feedback from any net worth or asset price variable in the
model. The equations for the asset price and wealth are
qt =
σβ
ϕK(1 − β)
Yt (53)
and
Wt =
η + σ − ηβ
ϕ (1− β)
Yt (54)
So asset prices and entrepreneurial wealth are simply proportional
to output.
6.4 Calibration
The model contains 13 parameters. Some of the parameters are stan-
dard, in the sense that they can be chosen to match key steady-state
ratios in the economy. Other parameters, in particular those specific
to the credit mechanism, are more difficult to assign values to. The
calibration I have chosen is designed to show how the mechanism might
work, not how it most likely does work, as there is little guidance from
actual observation in choosing plausible values for these parameters.
Table 1 shows the parameter values chosen for the baseline model.
The model is calibrated so that each period can be interpreted as
one quarter of a year. The discount factor β = 0.99 is a standard
choice in many general equilibrium macromodels (see e.g. Cooley and
Prescott (1995)). While in this model such a discount factor will lead to
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a lower real interest rate compared with models where there is perfect
enforcement or commitment, the difference is small under the baseline
parameterisation: the steady-state annual real interest rate is just un-
der 4%. The values for η, σ, τ, χ, γ were chosen to achieve a capital to
output ratio of 10, a labour share in output of 0.6, hours worked of
0.31 as a fraction of total available time, and a wage elasticity of labour
supply of 2, values very close again to those in Cooley and Prescott
(1995) and subsequent literature. The monetary policy reaction func-
tion parameter λ is set at the value used by Taylor (1993), although
the reaction function does not have exactly the same form. The rule
used in this paper is certainly too simplistic to be realistic, and is used
to illustrate the basic mechanisms of the model. The elasticity param-
eter θ determines a steady-state net mark-up for consumption goods
of 0.10, corresponding to the empirical findings by Basu and Fernald
(1997). The share of prices that are set one period in advance, κ, is
set at 0.5. In the extended model, with a cost of price adjustment,
there is a cost parameter ψ which is set as follows. Because the lin-
earised Rotemberg pricing equation is identical to a linearised pricing
equation with Calvo (1983) probabilities of price changes, the cost of
price adjustment can be calibrated to be quantitatively equivalent to a
particular Calvo adjustment frequency.9 In this model the equivalent
of a Calvo probability of keeping prices fixed of 2/3 is to set the cost
parameter of price changes ψ = 5.4. This calibration implies that firms
change their price on average every 3 quarters, in line with the esti-
mates in Sbordone (2002). The extended model also features a more
realistic monetary policy rule, which helps generate plausible inflation
dynamics. The form of the rule in the extended model is
R̂t = (1− ρR)λpipit + (1− ρR)λϕϕ̂t + ρRR̂t−1 + εR,t (55)
In other words, monetary policy now responds gradually to inflation,
and also responds to the mark-up, which is a proxy for the deviation of
output from the level of output that would prevail under flexible prices
(when the mark-up is constant). The calibrated values for {λpi , λϕ, ρR}
are {1.5,−2, 0.9}.
The crucial parameters for the strength of the credit mechanism
are the productivity difference between producers and investors α/γ,
the steady-state ratio of productive to unproductive agents n, and
the probability of a highly productive agent becoming less productive,
δ. The parameters n and α/γ were chosen so that productive agents
hold about 2/3 of the capital stock in steady state, the same value as
that in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). But other combinations of these
9Although the calibration can be set so that the linearised pricing equations are iden-
tical, the welfare effects, and therefore the optimal monetary policy, are not necessarily
identical because they are based on the non-linearised versions of the pricing equation.
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parameters could achieve the same ratio, and generate either more
or less persistence. The parameter δ was chosen to be low enough so
that the credit mechanism generates substantial persistence, while still
producing model responses that appear well behaved.
6.5 Response to aggregate productivity shock
In this section I consider the response of the model economy to aggre-
gate productivity shocks. I compare these responses with the responses
of a ‘flexible price’ version of the model (with κ = 0, so that all prices
can be changed in each period), and also with the response of the fully
efficient model, outlined in section (6.3). Figure 1 shows the response
of output, the price of capital, and aggregate entrepreneurial wealth.
The units on the vertical axes are percentage deviations from steady
state. The units on the horizontal axes are quarters, with the shock
taking place in quarter 1. The productivity shock is a 0.25 per cent fall
in aggregate productivity, which lasts only for a single period. In other
words, aggregate productivity follows a white noise process. Output
in the efficient model falls by about 1.7 times the fall in productivity,
which is the combined effect of lower productivity and lower labour
inputs. After the shock, output returns fairly quickly to its steady-
state value. We know from equation (52) that, if productivity follows
a white noise process, then the persistence of output, as measured by
the autocorrelation coefficient, is equal to η(τ+1)τ+η+σ . Using the baseline
calibration, this is equal to 0.17. Asset prices and aggregate wealth
respond with the same proportional magnitudes as output. For the
flexible price model with credit frictions, the initial output response is
the same as the efficient response, because all determinants of output
other than labour (i.e. last period’s borrowing decision, the share of
capital held by productive agents, and investment in inventories) are
predetermined. But note that the asset price falls more than twice as
much. This amplification is due to the following mechanism. In period
1, producers and investors experience an unanticipated loss of out-
put, as well as an unanticipated reduction in the value of producers’
collateral. This means that in period 1, producers cannot maintain
their share of the capital stock: they can now afford less than the
steady-state share, because they buy capital with the reinvested share
of output and with collateralised borrowing. This means that capital
will be less efficiently used for production from period 2 onwards. Be-
cause today’s capital price is the present discounted value of all future
marginal returns to capital, the price of capital falls by more than in
the efficient model, and this fall further exacerbates the reduction in
producers’ net worth. Output in period 2, rather than rising back to-
wards the steady-state, falls further due to the shift in capital from
highly productive to less productive entrepreneurs. After period 2,
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it takes time for the most productive agents to rebuild their share of
wealth, and it therefore takes time for asset prices and output to re-
turn to their steady-state values. It is interesting to note that the high
degree of amplification is achieved with a plausible parameter value for
the capital share and a plausible parameter value for the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (log utility implies a value of 1). Cordoba and
Ripoll (2004) find that, in a model where the agents’ productivity level
is fixed permanently, no substantial amplification can be achieved un-
less either of these two parameters take on values that are well outside
the range usually thought to be plausible, such as capital shares in
excess of 0.5, and elasticities of substitition below 0.1. However, their
results are the consequence of a set of modelling choices that imply a
very close link between capital shares, productivity differences and the
rate of time preferences. It is therefore not possible to vary one with-
out getting implausible results for another. This is not the case for our
model, where productivity levels are distinct from the capital share in
production, allowing greater productivity gaps between investors and
entrepreneurs while still preserving plausible steady state distributions
of output and capital.
In the full model, with sticky prices as well, the initial fall in aggre-
gate output is slightly muted relative to the efficient and flexible price
models. As output falls, the nominal price level needs to rise for any
given monetary policy stance that does not fully accommodate the out-
put fall. But prices are sticky, so they do not rise enough. This causes
the real marginal cost of the retail sector to rise, as not all retailers are
able to charge their desired mark-up. For the entrepreneurs, however,
paying a lower mark-up is beneficial: it increases the value of their
output in consumption terms, which in turn increases the amount of
labour they want to hire, relative to the amount of labour they would
want to hire with constant mark-ups. This mechanism, while appear-
ing perhaps non-standard when described this way, is simply the New
Keynesian channel whereby those who cannot change prices change
output to meet demand. Ouput is therefore higher than it would have
been under flexible prices. So aggregate output falls by less in the
period of the shock. This has important consequences for output dy-
namics in future periods. Because output falls by less, there is a smaller
redistribution of wealth from producers to investors. There is there-
fore a smaller response of asset prices and aggregate wealth, because
less of the capital stock shifts from producers to investors during the
transmission of the shock. The entire credit - asset price effect has
been dampened by the stickiness of prices. The response of inflation,
nominal interest rates and the mark-up in the sticky price model are
also shown in figure 1.
The key difference, relative to standard sticky-price monetary mod-
els, is that under flexible prices the output fall from period 2 onwards
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Figure 1: Response to productivity shock (baseline model)
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is no longer fully efficient. This can be seen from the fact that the
no-frictions level of output, which also corresponds to a social planner
solution in the absence of all frictions, lies strictly above the flexible-
price level of output from period 2 onwards.10. In standard sticky-price
monetary models, it is considered desirable for monetary policy to re-
spond aggressively to inflation following a productivity shock, as this
will simultaneously reduce inflation and ensure that output follows the
same path as a model without price stickiness. In those models, as
soon as productivity has returned to its steady-state level, so does the
flexible price level of output. But in the credit frictions model consid-
ered in this paper, only the initial fall in output is an efficient response
to a change in aggregate productivity. The subsequent further fall,
and the slow return to steady state are the result of inefficiencies in
the credit market.
How large the dampening effect of sticky prices will be depends on
how aggressively monetary policy responds to inflation. As the adverse
productivity shock puts upward pressure on inflation, the monetary
policy reaction function dictates that the nominal interest rate should
rise. The more aggressive the rise in interest rates, the smaller the
resulting increase in inflation, and the smaller the reduction in mark-
ups. As monetary policy becomes sufficiently aggressive in its response
to inflation, the economy’s response to productivity shocks approaches
that of the flexible price economy, where mark-ups are constant. As
monetary policy becomes less aggressive, by responding less strongly
to inflation, output fluctuations become smaller. However, in order
to ensure determinacy of the equilibrium, monetary policy must react
to inflation with a coefficient of at least 1, so aggressiveness cannot
be toned down too far. Ensuring determinacy of the equilibrium is
one interpretation of what central banks refer to as anchoring inflation
expectations.
One further aspect of the model that is worth mentioning is that,
even though the level of productivity of each firm is only perturbed for
a single period, the measured aggregate level of productivity falls per-
sistently. Panel 4 of figure 1 shows the response of the Solow residual,
At. This is calculated as the total factor productivity in the economy
under the assumption that there is no heterogeneity in productivity.
When log-linearised, it is equal to
Aˆt =
y
y + y′
yˆt +
y′
y + y′
yˆ′t − ηXˆt−1 − (1− σ − η)lˆt (56)
10It is important to emphasise that to achieve the first best it is necessary for the path
of all variables to match the social planner path, not just output. I am using output
deviations here as an indication of whether we are moving further from or closer to an
optimal path. A full welfare analysis is carried out in the next section.
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The shift in capital from producers to investors causes measured
aggregate productivity to fall further in the period following the shock,
and given that the shift in capital is persistent, the fall in aggregate
productivity is persistent too. Furthermore, the extent of the fall de-
pends on how monetary policy reacts to the shock. If monetary policy
keeps inflation strictly constant, aggregate productivity falls further,
relative to the case where monetary policy allows inflation to rise tem-
porarily. The model therefore gives an interesting perspective on the
interaction between aggregate productivity, heterogeneity and mone-
tary policy. This is discussed in more detail in the next section.
6.6 Response to monetary policy shock
Figure 2 shows the model economy’s response to a temporary white
noise shock to the monetary policy rule, where the model now features
price adjustment costs and the monetary policy rule (55)11. The shock
is calibrated to cause a 0.25 per cent rise in the annualised nominal
interest rate. The discussion here is brief, because most of the mech-
anism is similar to that in the case of a productivity shock. Only
the initial phase of the transmission of the disturbance differs. Nom-
inal interest rates rise in response to the shock. Because retailers are
unable to lower their prices sufficiently in response to the monetary
contraction, their mark-ups rise. Entrepreneurs therefore face a fall in
the consumption value of their output, which reduces net worth both
via a direct effect of the mark-up and via the consequent reduction
in labour inputs. The fall in output is only 10bp, but total wealth is
around 70bp. Because of the leverage effect, producers suffer a larger
fall in net worth than investors. Their share of total wealth falls by
nearly 30 per cent, so the wealth distribution is shifted from those with
high productivity to those with low productivity. This lowers return
on capital in future periods, which causes a fall in the price of capital
today, resulting in a reduction of net worth that is much larger than the
reduction of the initial period’s output alone. Output in the following
period is lower still, because capital is now being used less efficiently.
The return to the steady-state happens gradually, as producers rebuild
their share of wealth, so that the wealth distribution returns to its sta-
tionary distribution. Note that in this case the efficient path of output,
as well as the path of output under flexible prices, remains constant,
because monetary policy would have no effect in this model absent
sticky prices.
It is also interesting to note that aggregate productivity, as mea-
sured by the Solow residual, falls in response to a monetary contraction,
11The response of this price adjustment cost version of the model to productivity shocks
is omitted, but is quantitatively and qualitatively very close to the baseline model.
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as capital shifts from high to low productivity agents, and is therefore
less efficiently used even for a given level of inputs. This puts an in-
teresting perspective on the Real Business Cycle and monetary policy
literature. The RBC tradition is to claim that monetary policy does
not explain much of the variation in output, because a large share of the
fluctuation can be explained as an endogenous response to exogenous
productivity or technology shocks (see e.g. Prescott (1986) and Plosser
(1989). But if measured aggregate productivity is not exogenous, but
instead is affected by monetary policy shocks, as well as by the sys-
tematic response of monetary policy to other shocks, this conclusion in
unwarranted. More recently, several authors of the real business cycle
tradition have questioned the interpretation of aggregate productivity
as strictly determined by technology alone (see e.g. Prescott (1998)
and Kehoe and Prescott (2002)). Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004)
have suggested that aggregate productivity, rather than being taken as
given, is something that needs to be formally explained by a model.12
They call it the “efficiency wedge”. The model I present here is one
possible formalisation of a process that makes the efficiency wedge en-
dogenous, and sensitive to monetary policy. It also counters Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan’s (2004) claim that credit frictions are unlikely
to explain a significant share of business cycle fluctuations, by show-
ing that credit frictions can be the cause of variations in the efficiency
wedge.
7 The optimal policy problem
Having analysed the model properties under a simple ad hoc monetary
policy rule and with monetary policy that stabilises inflation instantly
and perfectly, I now turn to the question of what optimal monetary
policy is.
7.1 Objective of the policy-maker
The policy-maker maximises the weighted sum of the welfare of en-
trepreneurs and of workers. The one-period welfare function is there-
fore the sum of the utility of all the agents. There is no unique way to
sum utilities, but one candidate is
Ut = ln (ct + c
′
t) + µ ln
(
cwt −
χlτ+1t
τ + 1
)
(57)
12In the vintage capital version of RBC models, aggregate productivity is largely en-
dogenous, as technology shocks only affect the newest vintage of capital, and the remaining
dynamics of aggregate productivity are driven by the optimal switch to new capital.
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Figure 2: Response to monetary policy shock (price adjustment cost model)
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This formulation uses total consumption across entrepreneurs, who
are ex-ante identical. Workers are not identical to entrepreneurs: they
face different constraints and have a different utility function, so they
are treated separately, and added to the aggregate welfare function
using µ, the Pareto weight on workers. 13
The policy-maker then solves the dynamic problem of maximising
welfare, conditional on being in some given initial state, subject to the
private sector model equations outlined in the appendix. This problem
takes the form
max
∞∑
t=0
βt {Ut − λtf(x1,t−1, x1,t, x2,t, x2,t+1)} (58)
where f(.) is a vector of the equations describing the behaviour
of the private sector, x1 is a vector of the natural state variables of
the private sector model, x2,t is a vector of non-predetermined private
sector variables and λt is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. The max-
imisation is subject to initial conditions x1,−1, which are the initial
conditions of the natural state variables.The natural state variables of
the private sector model are the level of borrowing bt−1, the lagged user
cost ut−1, and the level of capital held by productive agents kt−1.
14
As discussed in, e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), we must be care-
ful how to treat the Lagrange multipliers on the various constraints.
The multipliers on equations with a forward-looking element must be
treated as additional state variables. This is because these Lagrange
multipliers capture the policy-maker’s earlier promises upon which pri-
vate sector expectations were formed. It is this particular treatment
of past promises that makes the policy a ‘commitment’ policy. It is
assumed that the policy-maker acts as a Stackelberg leader, and does
not re-optimise after the private sector has formed expectations. The
remaining Lagrange multipliers are treated as non-predetermined, i.e.
they can jump freely at period t. The predetermined Lagrange mul-
tipliers in this particular system are the multipliers on the borrowing
constraint, the Phillips curve, the expected return on investment and
the asset-pricing condition for capital, which are the equations of the
private sector model that involve expectations of future variables.
13This particular welfare function does not give any importance to the distribution of
consumption across entrepreneurs, as only total entrepreneurial consumption matters. The
distribution of consumption across entrepreneurs matters indirectly, of course, because a
reallocation of resources away from highly productive producers lowers total output, and
hence total consumption. Using a welfare function that takes into account the distribution
of consumption among entrepreneurs explicitly would make credit-driven fluctuations more
costly in welfare terms, and therefore likely lead to higher optimal inflation variability.
14There is no unique way to choose state variables. One could also work with wealth
and the share of wealth held by producers as states.
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The system of first-order conditions is solved by log-linearising it
around its steady-state, and then solving the resulting system of lin-
ear difference equations using the Schur decomposition as described in
Soderlind (1999).
7.2 Optimal response to productivity shock
To understand what optimal monetary policy is trying to achieve, it
is useful to consider, in addition to the optimal policy solution, two
other solutions for the model, also considered in the section 6.5. First, I
consider the solution of the model when there are no credit frictions and
prices are fully flexible. Recall from section 6.3 that his implies that
output dynamics are driven entirely driven by the exogenous process
for aggregate productivity and lagged output. There is no feedback
from any net worth or asset price variable in the model. And asset
prices and entrepreneurial wealth are simply proportional to output.
A second version of the model that is useful for comparison is the
model with credit frictions but flexible prices. This can be interpreted
either as an economy where there are no impediments or costs to chang-
ing prices, or as an economy where the monetary policy maker is con-
cerned only with stabilising inflation, which can be achieved perfectly
in this model.
Let us now consider the optimal monetary policy or Ramsey solu-
tion. This is the model economy with credit frictions and sticky prices,
and with a monetary policy maker who maximises the welfare of the
private sector agents as outlined in detail in section (7.1). As shown
in figure (3), the initial output fall is smaller than in the frictionless
model and the flex-price credit model, and inflation is allowed to rise
initially. The formal solution to a full optimisation problem confirms
the intuition gained in the previous section: it is optimal for the policy-
maker to dampen the initial output fall, because of the consequences
it has in future periods. The policy-maker is therefore trading off the
efficiency loss of dampening the initial output and asset price fall (and
the temporary rise in inflation) against the efficiency gain from limiting
the damaging effect of the credit propagation mechanism in subsequent
periods.
In effect, the combination of both credit frictions and sticky prices
has resulted in a traditional short-run trade-off between the deviation
of output from its efficient level and inflation. A trade-off between the
output gap and inflation in the short run is largely absent from the New
Keynesian literature unless one considers shocks that hit the price level
directly.15 . This absence of a fundamental trade-off has been dubbed
15In models such as those discussed by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(2003), the level of output that prevails under flexible prices is the appropriate target for
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Figure 3: Response to adverse productivity shock
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Table 2: Theoretical moments of selected variables
Ramsey Frictionless Flex-price credit
s.d.(y + y′) 1.157 2.000 6.658
s.d.(q) 0.798 2.000 8.974
s.d.(pi) 0.128 0 0
a.r.(y + y′) 0.431 0.167 0.779
a.r.(q) 0.698 0.167 0.806
a.r.(pi) -0.246 0 0
s.d.(εP,t) 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: s.d. denotes standard deviation, expressed in per cent, and a.r de-
notes first-order autocorrelation.
Moments were calculated for log-linear deviations of aggregate output
(y + y′), the price of capital (q), and inflation(pi).
Each column represents a different version of the model.
the “divine coincidence” by Blanchard (2005), in reference to the fact
that closing the welfare-relevant measure of the output gap coincides
with stabilising inflation. Angeletos (2003) also discussed this problem
with the New Keynesian models. In my approach, there is no longer
any divine coincidence, because stabilising prices does not stabilise
output around its efficient level, or even its constrained efficient level.
And as shown in figure 3, the optimal policy involves allowing inflation
to rise briefly following an adverse productivity shock. The nature of
the propagation mechanism due to credit frictions implies that in this
model the trade-off is not between current inflation and the current
gap between output and its efficient level. Instead, there is a dynamic
trade-off between current inflation and the future gap between output
and its efficient level. This dynamic nature of the trade-off has impor-
tant consequences for the concept of the output gap. It means that,
even if we could measure it accurately, the distance between output and
its efficient level at any point in time is not a useful summary of the
objective of monetary policy, in the way that the New Keynesian gap
between output and its flexible price level summarises the monetary
policy objective.
Table 2 illustrates the trade-off and the desirability of smoothing
monetary policy, and this level can theoretically be achieved as long as there are no direct
shocks to the price level. For the case of productivity shocks, there is therefore no trade-
off between output fluctuations from their flex-price level and inflation deviations from
target. This is not the case if other frictions are added. For example, Erceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000) show that a trade-off also exists if both wages and prices are sticky.
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output and asset price fluctuations. Under optimal or Ramsey policy,
inflation variability16 is non-zero. It is of the same order of magnitude
as the variability of actual inflation in low-inflation industrialised coun-
tries such as the US17. Output variability under optimal policy is much
smaller than in the flex-price credit model. The reduction in output
variability also implies a reduction in asset price variability. Quan-
titatively, the ability of the monetary policy-maker to affect the real
economy in the short run allows most of the adverse effects of credit
frictions to be off-set. In the illustrative calibration used here, the stan-
dard deviation of output under optimal policy is around one sixth of
the standard deviation of output under price stability. In other words,
a little inflation variability buys a large reduction in output variability.
Comparing the Ramsey outcome with the frictionless model, we see
that aggregate output is more persistent, but less variable, under the
Ramsey policy than in the frictionless model. The increased persistence
of Ramsey output arises because it is not efficient to off-set the initial
output fall entirely, so there is still some persistence from the credit
mechanism that prevents output from rising back to its steady-state
level as quickly as the frictionless model. This is illustrated in figure (3)
by the fact that the wealth share of producers still falls under optimal
policy.
8 Robustness Checks
In this section I want to explore the extent to which the quantitative
conclusions are sensitive to the particular choice of parameters. I will
vary 4 key parameters. I explore the consequences of (a) putting a
smaller Pareto weight on workers (µ = 0.1), (b) making labour supply
less elastic (τ = 1), (c) making goods prices less sticky (ψ = 2), and (d)
weakening the credit channel by lowering the productivity gap between
producers and investors (αγ = 1.01).
The results appear to be robust to even these large parameter
changes, with the crucial parameters being the strength of the credit
channel and the extent of nominal rigidities, as can be expected, since
these are the two frictions the policy-maker is trading off against each
other. The changes in the model properties help to firm up the under-
lying intuition, so I will describe them case by case.
Lowering the welfare weight on workers makes output less variable,
16The theoretical standard deviations and autocorrelations of the model variables were
calculated using the method described in Hamilton (1994), p. 265-266.
17The standard deviation of US quarterly inflation, on the GDP deflator measure, is
0.25% for the sample period 1983:1-2005:1. (Source: US BEA). The standard deviation of
US quarterly output, measured as deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend, was
1.11% over the same period.
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Table 3: Robustness of optimal policy results to parameter changes
baseline workers lab.elast. nom.rigid. prod.gap
s.d.(y + y′) 1.157 1.1337 1.105 1.270 1.427
s.d.(q) 0.798 0.597 0.764 1.133 1.139
s.d.(pi) 0.128 0.196 0.160 0.313 0.094
a.r.(y + y′) 0.431 0.373 0.359 0.558 0.300
a.r.(q) 0.698 0.665 0.660 0.676 0.371
a.r.(pi) -0.246 0.245 -0.347 -0.372 0.220
s.d.(εP,t) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: s.d. denotes standard deviation, expressed in per cent, and a.r. de-
notes first-order autocorrelation.
Moments were calculated for log-linear deviations of aggregate output
(y + y′), the price of capital (q), and inflation(pi).
Each column represents a different version of the model.
but inflation more so. That is because, in order to dampen the effect of
the shock on initial output, the expansionary monetary policy dampens
output partly by its effect on labour. Since only workers supply labour,
if policy is less concerned with worker welfare, it can tolerate greater
deviations from the optimal path of labour, meaning it will dampen
the output fall more strongly and tolerate higher inflation variability.
Less elastic labour supply implies that output falls by less follow-
ing an adverse productivity shock, even in the frictionless model. That
automatically weakens the credit channel, leading to less output vari-
ability. But it also means that monetary policy has to generate more
inflation to dampen output by a given amount. In other words, the
slope of the short-run Phillips curve has become steeper. So inflation
variability is higher.
Lowering price stickiness gives monetary policy less traction, but
leaves the strength of the credit channel unchanged. Monetary policy
is therefore less able to dampen output responses, and a stronger burst
of inflation is needed to dampen output by a given amount. The result
is that both output variability and inflation variability under optimal
policy are larger.
Finally, weakening the credit channel brings the model closer to
the frictionless model. Higher variability of output can be tolerated,
because it no longer has strong effects on the efficiency with which
capital is used. And inflation variability is smaller, because there is no
longer the need to use inflation to dampen the output response to a
productivity shock as strongly.
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9 Conclusion
I have outlined a macroeconomic model where credit markets oper-
ate less than perfectly due to enforcement problems, and I have used
this model to discuss the implications of imperfect credit markets for
monetary policy. The analysis has shown that the credit mechanism
can amplify shocks and make them highly persistent, so that small,
temporary disturbances to productivity or monetary policy have large
and persistent effects on output. The basic mechanism is that, because
highly productive agents find it optimal to borrow from less productive
agents, they are leveraged. Any aggregate disturbance will affect bor-
rowers’ net worth more than lenders’ net worth due to leverage, and
so will affect the wealth distribution. The most productive agents will
end up holding less of the economy’s productive resources, which will
lower future aggregate output and further depresses the current price of
capital, exacerbating the shift in the wealth distribution. It takes time
for the most productive agents to rebuild their share of wealth, and
output therefore deviates from its steady-state level for many periods.
Aggregate productivity in this model is endogenous, and is affected by
the systematic response of monetary policy to non-policy shocks, as
well as by monetary policy shocks. In the presence of sticky prices,
monetary policy has the ability to dampen the output effect of pro-
ductivity shocks by allowing temporary fluctuations in inflation. Such
initial dampening will mitigate the reallocation of resources away from
the most productive agents in the future.
I then conduct a quantitative analysis of optimal monetary policy.
It is shown that, in the case of productivity shocks, the presence of
both types of rigidities creates a trade-off between inflation variability
and output variability. Because the initial output fall leads to a re-
allocation of resources toward less productive agents, it will result in
large future deviations of output from its efficient level. So there is a
trade-off between the rise in inflation immediately following the shock,
and the fall in future output relative to its efficient level. The dynamic
nature of this trade-off implies that neither the gap between output
and its flexible-price level, nor the gap between output and its uncon-
strained efficient level are adequate descriptions of monetary policy
objectives. Allowing a small temporary rise in inflation following an
adverse productivity shock is optimal, because it results in output be-
ing much closer to its efficient level in future periods. A large reduction
in output variability can be achieved by allowing only a small amount
of inflation variability. Conversely, the cost of stabilising inflation too
aggressively can be large.
Of course, real life policy decisions must be made without detailed
knowledge of the state of the economy and of the laws of motion of the
economy, so even if credit frictions are quantitatively important, the
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large reduction in output variability suggested by this model may not
be achievable. Nevertheless, a realistic policy prescription might be
not to stabilise inflation too aggressively following a shock that pushes
output and inflation in opposite directions, especially at times when
the financial system is fragile or borrowers’ balance sheets are weak.
36
A Model equations
The full model is described by the following equations. The timing
convention is that all variables that are decided at date t after the
realisation of the period t shock will have the subscript t. Predeter-
mined variables therefore have a subscript t− 1. The wage of workers
is denoted zt.
Total wealth of entrepreneurs (Wt)
Wt = (η + σ)
yt + y
′
t
ϕt
+ qt (59)
the share of wealth held by producers (st)
stWt = (1− δ)
[
(η + σ)
yt
ϕt
+ qtkt−1 − bt−1
]
+ nδ
[
(η + σ)
y′t
ϕt
+ qt(1− kt−1) + bt−1
]
(60)
the user cost of capital (ut)
ut =
σ
η
(βWt − qt) (61)
capital held by producers (kt)
kt = β
σ
η + σ
stWt
ut
(62)
borrowing constraint (bt)
bt = Etqt+1kt (63)
Phillips curve (pit)
pit (pit − 1) = βEt
[
uw,t+1
uw,t
pit+1 (pit+1 − 1)
]
+
θ − 1
ψ
(yt + y
′
t)
(
θ
θ − 1
1
ϕt
− 1
)
(64)
return on investment (rt)
rt = Et
(
ε
1
η+σ
P,t+1γ
1
η+σϕ
−
1
η+σ
t+1 z
−
1−η−σ
η+σ
t+1 u
−
σ
η+σ
t
)
(65)
pricing equation for capital (qt)
ut = qt − Et
qt+1
rt
(66)
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labour market equilibrium in terms of workers’ wage (zt)
z
1+τ
τ
t
(
1
χ
)1/τ
=
1− η − σ
η + σ
(Wt − qt) (67)
Fisher equation18 determining the nominal interest rate (Rt)
Et
Rt
pit+1
1
(η + σ)
y′t+1
ϕt+1
ϕ+ qt+1
= Etrt
1
(η + σ)
y′t+1
ϕt+1
ϕ+ qt+1
(69)
producers’ output (yt)
yt = α
1
η+σ ε
1
η+σ
P,t u
η
η+σ
t−1 (ztϕt)
−
1−η−σ
η+σ
kt−1
σ
(70)
investors’ output (y′t)
y′t = γ
1
η+σ ε
1
η+σ
P,t u
η
η+σ
t−1 (ztϕt)
−
1−η−σ
η+σ
(1− kt−1)
σ
(71)
definition of uw, which is the marginal utility of consumption of
workers
1
uw,t
=
τ
τ + 1
(
1
χ
) 1
τ
z
1+τ
τ
t + (yt + y
′
t)
(
1−
1
ϕt
)
−
ψ
2
(pit − 1)
2 (72)
the aggregate productivity process (εP,t)
log εP,t = ρ log εP,t−1 + υt (73)
When the model is solved for an ad hoc monetary policy, as opposed
to optimal monetary policy, the final equation to close the model is the
monetary policy rule.
18This is the standard asset pricing arbitrage condition, based on the marginal utility
of consumption of the investors. I have made the following substitution:
Etc
′
t+1 = (1− β)
[
(η + σ)
y′t+1
ϕt+1
+ qt+1
]
(68)
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